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A B S T R A C T
Phishing emails provide a means to inﬁltrate the technical systems of organisations by encouraging employees to
click on malicious links or attachments. Despite the use of awareness campaigns and phishing simulations,
employees remain vulnerable to phishing emails. The present research uses a mixed methods approach to ex-
plore employee susceptibility to targeted phishing emails, known as spear phishing. In study one, nine spear
phishing simulation emails sent to 62,000 employees over a six-week period were rated according to the pre-
sence of authority and urgency inﬂuence techniques. Results demonstrated that the presence of authority cues
increased the likelihood that a user would click a suspicious link contained in an email. In study two, six focus
groups were conducted in a second organisation to explore whether additional factors within the work en-
vironment impact employee susceptibility to spear phishing. We discuss these factors in relation to current
theoretical approaches and provide implications for user communities.
1. Introduction
Organisations are increasingly under threat from attackers at-
tempting to inﬁltrate their computer systems by exploiting the beha-
viour of human users (Sasse et al., 2001). One means by which this can
be achieved is via targeted, fraudulent emails, which aim to persuade
employees to click on malicious links, download malicious attachments
or transfer organisational funds or other sensitive information. This
practice is commonly known as spear phishing (Workman, 2008). A
2016 Cyber Incident Report (Verizon, 2016) highlighted that over
2,000 organisations experienced a data breach in 2015, with the
highest number experienced by organisations in the ﬁnancial sector (a
total number of 795). This same report also showed that approximately
1 in 10 employees of such organisations clicked on links or opened
attachments contained within sanctioned phishing email tests.
One way in which organisations attempt to raise awareness of spear
phishing emails amongst their staﬀ is through the use of simulated
phishing tests. This involves the organisation sending simulated, tar-
geted phishing emails to a number of employees and monitoring the
resultant ‘click-rate’ (i.e., the proportion of employees who click on
malicious links within the email). Such emails, whether sent as part of
simulated phishing tests or by actual fraudsters, use a range of inﬂuence
techniques to encourage people to respond quickly and without con-
sideration. This includes instilling a sense of urgency or limited avail-
ability and exploiting compliance with authority ﬁgures (Atkins and
Huang, 2013; Cialdini, 2007; Stajano and Wilson, 2011). Examples of
inﬂuence techniques used in spear phishing emails are shown in
Table 1. When such attacks are successful, they can result in substantial
reputational damage, monetary losses or operational impacts for the
organisation involved (e.g., Landesman, 2016; Piggin, 2016; Zetter,
2016). It is this threat that has contributed to the rise of anti-phishing
training games, formal phishing simulation tests, and interface design
initiatives to increase employee awareness and assist in the eﬀective
management of phishing risks within the workplace (Abawajy, 2014;
Dodge et al., 2007).
Despite an increased focus on training and awareness approaches, a
2016 report produced by security training ﬁrm PhishMe highlighted
that employees continue to be vulnerable to phishing attacks, with an
average response rate of approximately 20% (Computer Fraud and
Security, 2016; PhishMe, 2016). This includes responses to both spear
phishing and generic phishing emails. This report, which was based on
the analysis of over 8 million simulated phishing emails, also high-
lighted that 67% of employees who respond to simulated phishing at-
tacks are repeat victims and therefore likely to respond to phishing
emails more than once. The continuing vulnerability of many organi-
sations to phishing attacks has led the UK National Cyber Security
Centre to recently release speciﬁc guidance for organisations regarding
how they can defend themselves from the phishing threat
(NCSC, 2018a).
The hierarchical nature of many workplaces and employees’ limited
time means that they are likely to be particularly susceptible to the
authority and urgency inﬂuence techniques highlighted by
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Cialdini (2007) and Stajano and Wilson (2011). Elements of the parti-
cular work context in which a spear phishing email is received (such as
receiving an urgent request whilst being particularly busy or distracted)
are also likely to exacerbate susceptibility. However, diﬃculties in ac-
cessing data related to susceptibility within workplace settings have
severely limited current understanding of these factors. Therefore, there
is much to be gained from investigating the role of both inﬂuence
techniques and work-related contextual factors using applied data
sources. This will not only aid theoretical development, but also assist
in advancing practical interventions. The present paper uses data from
two organisations that routinely handle sensitive information to address
this current limitation; using a novel approach that enables existing
theoretical concepts to be considered and new ones to be identiﬁed in
relation to applied workplace settings.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we brieﬂy consider current
theoretical approaches and research ﬁndings relevant to susceptibility
to spear phishing emails. We then present two studies conducted in
organisational settings. In Study One, we take a novel approach to the
examination of message-related factors (speciﬁcally, the presence of
authority and urgency inﬂuence techniques) by examining historic data
from simulated phishing tests within organisation A. In Study Two, we
undertake a qualitative exploration of wider susceptibility factors re-
lated to the individual recipient and the context that they are in (in-
cluding how familiar they are with the message sender, whether they
are expecting a particular communication, and their awareness of the
potential risk of spear phishing) by exploring employee perceptions of
susceptibility within the work environment using a focus group meth-
odology in a second organisation (organisation B). Although
Williams et al. (2017a) discuss the potential role of these various as-
pects on susceptibility to online inﬂuence in their theoretical review,
there is limited empirical evidence to date. The current studies take a
ﬁrst step in addressing this gap. We conclude by considering these
ﬁndings in relation to the potential expansion of current theories. We
also consider potential contributions to practical applications, including
interface design, employee training and awareness, and decision sup-
port systems.
1.1. Theoretical justiﬁcation
Over the last decade, researchers have attempted to identify the
primary factors that may impact individual susceptibility to phishing
emails. This has led to the development and application of a range of
theoretical frameworks, including the Integrated Information
Processing Model of Phishing Susceptibility (IIPM; Vishwanath et al.,
2011), the Suspicion, Cognition, and Automaticity Model (SCAM;
Vishwanath et al., 2016), and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT;
Rogers, 1975). Although these models show a degree of overlap, they
have rarely been studied together, despite the fact that all of the
highlighted elements are likely to inﬂuence susceptibility to spear
phishing. For instance, PMT has been more commonly applied to gen-
eric security behaviour and examines individual perceptions of threat
and perceived ability to manage such threats. Conversely, the SCAM
incorporates individual knowledge, beliefs and habits in relation to
phishing susceptibility speciﬁcally. Finally, the IIPM focuses primarily
on the information processing style that is used when a phishing email
is encountered. These models have also not been extensively studied
using organisational data. Exploring the role of all of these aspects
within organisational settings provides a unique opportunity to un-
derstand the full range of factors that may inﬂuence susceptibility in the
workplace. We further consider each of these models in relation to our
study aims below.
1.1.1. The integrated information processing model of phishing susceptibility
(IPPM)
The IPPM suggests that the likelihood that an individual will re-
spond to a phishing email is inﬂuenced by the content of the email, such
as the inﬂuence techniques that it contains, the use and accuracy of
email signatures, and the sender address (Vishwanath et al., 2011).
Speciﬁcally, the model claims that people's limited attentional re-
sources are monopolised by the presence of particular inﬂuence tech-
niques such as urgency (e.g., an urgent deadline). This increases the
likelihood that people will rely on relatively automatic forms of in-
formation processing (known as heuristic processing) when deciding
how to respond and will not engage in more in-depth consideration of
the legitimacy of the email (known as systematic processing: Eagly and
Chaiken, 1993; Harrison et al., 2016a; Kahneman, 2011; Luo et al.,
2013; Vishwanath et al., 2011; 2016). As a result, authenticity cues
within the email (i.e., features a person uses to determine legitimacy),
such as an incorrect sender address, are more likely to be overlooked.
The relative role of particular inﬂuence techniques in inﬂuencing
individual susceptibility to phishing remains uncertain, however
(Oliveira et al., 2017). For instance, when comparing participant re-
sponses to genuine, phishing and spear phishing emails that contained
authority, scarcity or social proof inﬂuence techniques,
Butavicius et al. (2015) found greater susceptibility to emails that
contained authority cues. Williams et al. (2017b) also manipulated the
presence of authority cues within fraudulent software updates whilst
keeping the presence of urgency cues constant and found that partici-
pants were particularly susceptible to updates containing authority
cues. However, in a ﬁeld experiment where diﬀerent phishing messages
were sent to more than 2,600 participants, the presence of authority
inﬂuence techniques was not found to increase click-rates
(Wright et al., 2014). In their analysis of participants’ self-reported
reasons for responding to fraudulent updates, Williams et al. (2017a)
further highlighted the role of other message-related cues, such as how
familiar participants were with the particular update message (i.e.,
whether they had received similar messages before) and whether they
were expecting a particular communication.
To our knowledge, the relative role of such inﬂuence techniques has
yet to be explicitly examined within workplace settings. This is despite
the fact that particular inﬂuence techniques may be diﬀerentially re-
levant, and therefore have diﬀerent eﬀects, in work contexts. Within
study one, therefore, we explicitly investigate whether the presence of
authority and urgency techniques inﬂuence employee susceptibility to
simulated spear phishing emails within the workplace. We extend this
in Study Two by examining employee discussions of the message-re-
lated factors that they report as making them more or less likely to
respond to an email that they receive.
1.1.2. The suspicion, cognition and automaticity model (SCAM)
The SCAM claims that the extent to which heuristic processing
strategies are used when evaluating emails varies according to char-
acteristics of the individual recipient (Vishwanath et al., 2016). These
diﬀerences primarily relate to individual beliefs regarding online risk
(Barnett and Breakwell, 2001; Bromiley and Curley, 1992), which en-
compasses the degree of experience, eﬃcacy, and subject-speciﬁc
knowledge that people have (Downs et al., 2006; Canﬁeld et al., 2016;
Table 1
Example inﬂuence techniques that occur in phishing emails.
Technique Description
Authority Claims to come from an individual or institution that represents an
authority ﬁgure.
Urgency States that the receiver has a limited time to respond.
Reciprocity Claims to provide some form of favour to the recipient.
Social proof Suggests that other people have responded to the email.
Reward Claims to provide the receiver with a potential reward if they
respond.
Loss Claims that the receiver will suﬀer some form of loss if they fail to
respond.
Scarcity Suggests that an oﬀer or opportunity is limited in some way (e.g.,
for the ﬁrst 10 respondents).
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Pattinson et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2016). However, the relationship
between these factors remains unknown. A reliance on heuristic pro-
cessing is considered more likely to occur when an individuals’ ability
or motivation to engage in more in-depth processing of information is
reduced (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Therefore, individuals with a
greater awareness of the risks of online activity, and phishing speciﬁ-
cally, are considered more likely to engage in deeper processing of the
information contained within emails, such as authenticity cues. Con-
versely, those with a lower awareness are considered more likely to
engage in superﬁcial, heuristic forms of processing. Finally, individual's
established habits of behaviour in relation to email communications are
also considered to inﬂuence the degree of suspicion that they have to-
wards emails that they receive (Vishwanath, 2015; Vishwanath et al.,
2016).
It is not clear, however, to what extent such constructs apply within
a work context. For instance, people's beliefs regarding online risk may
diﬀer when they are at work compared to when they are at home,
particularly if there are diﬀerences in how they may be impacted per-
sonally by any potential breach and the degree of IT support that they
have available to them if they unintentionally respond to a phishing
email., Similarly, the extent to which current training approaches
provide suﬃcient knowledge to inﬂuence these beliefs and minimise
employee susceptibility remains uncertain (Caputo et al., 2014). Fi-
nally, any potential relationship between these constructs and the in-
formation processing strategy that is used may be further inﬂuenced by
wider aspects of the work environment, such as employees facing the
additional challenge of being busy, distracted, or having other urgent
primary goals competing for their time (Miarmi and DeBono, 2007;
Sivaramakrishnan and Manchanda, 2003; Vohs et al., 2008).
Within Study Two, therefore, we explore the potential role of all of
these factors within workplace settings. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
extent to which these factors are reﬂected in employee perceptions of
their own susceptibility to spear phishing. Such work is vital if the full
range of potential interventions, including technical, training, process,
and design solutions, are to be eﬀectively exploited within organisa-
tions (Irvine and Anderson, 2006).
1.1.3. Protection motivation theory (PMT)
Protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975) has been used to
highlight the role of individual perceptions of online threats and per-
ceived ability to cope with such threats in relation to security behaviour
more generally (e.g., Ng et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 2016). PMT states that
the likelihood of an individual engaging in protective behaviour is in-
ﬂuenced by their perceptions of the particular threat (i.e., the perceived
severity of the threat and their vulnerability to it) and the degree to
which they feel able to enact the necessary behaviours to protect
themselves (known as self-eﬃcacy). PMT has recently been applied to
the phishing domain. For example, a survey of 547 individuals con-
ducted by Wang et al. (2017) demonstrated that people's ‘phishing
threat perceptions’, combined with their (perceived) ability to detect
phishing emails, impacted their resultant coping strategies. Namely,
whether they focused on more eﬀective, task-focused strategies, such as
ﬁnding out more information and learning new skills to manage the
threat, or more maladaptive, emotion-focused strategies, such as
avoiding thinking about the issue. These coping strategies in turn in-
ﬂuenced their ability to distinguish between legitimate and phishing
emails. The potential inﬂuence of threat perceptions on responses to
phishing emails was also discussed by Conway et al. (2017), who
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with employees re-
garding their experiences of information security and phishing. The
ﬁndings of their analysis suggested that highly visible security proce-
dures reduced perceived vulnerability to online threats in the work-
place, resulting in less secure behaviour.
Within organisational settings, a number of technical and other
support mechanisms may be in place to assist users on information
security matters. For instance, the use of automated system alerts,
speciﬁc phishing warnings circulated via email, and IT phishing-re-
porting mechanisms may all reduce perceived vulnerability and en-
hance self-eﬃcacy in the workplace. However, there is very limited
research exploring how people conceive of these mechanisms, the ex-
tent to which they may inﬂuence perceptions of vulnerability and self-
eﬃcacy, and whether employees consider them beneﬁcial in helping
them to eﬀectively cope with the spear phishing risk. We explore the
role of such factors in Study Two.
2. Study one
The primary aim of study one was to examine whether the presence
of authority and urgency cues within simulated spear phishing emails
diﬀerentially impacted employee susceptibility to these emails within a
work context. Although phishing emails can make use of a range of
inﬂuence techniques (Cialdini, 2007; Stajano and Wilson, 2011), the
use of authority and urgency cues within phishing emails is known to be
particularly commonplace (Akbar, 2014; Atkins and Huang, 2013).
Authority cues focus on mimicking organisations or individuals that are
respected and have a degree of authority in relation to the recipient.
Urgency cues involve placing people under a degree of time pressure to
encourage them to respond quickly. As previous work has shown that
the presence of authority and urgency cues within phishing messages
can increase susceptibility in other contexts (Butavicius et al., 2015;
Williams et al., 2017a), we predict that these eﬀects will extend to a
workplace setting.
Hypothesis 1. The presence of urgency cues within simulated spear
phishing emails will be related to an increased likelihood of responding
to these emails.
Hypothesis 2. The presence of authority cues within simulated spear
phishing emails will be related to an increased likelihood of responding
to these emails.
2.1. Method
Historic phishing simulation data from a large UK public sector
organisation (with >50,000 employees) that interfaces with members
of the public and routinely handles sensitive information was analysed.
This data was collected by the organisation and provided to the re-
searchers in the form of aggregate responses to nine simulation emails
that were sent to all employees of the organisation (approximately
62,000 individuals) over a 6-week period in early 2015. These simu-
lation emails were sent from ﬁctitious organisations and were speciﬁ-
cally designed to closely mimic actual phishing emails that targeted the
organisation. Each employee received two of these simulation emails.
A limitation of using these applied datasets was that we were unable
to ensure that all simulation emails were sent to the same number of
employees. Further, we did not have access to participants’ demo-
graphic information. Table 2 shows the number of recipients for each of
the nine emails. An example simulated phishing email is also shown in
Fig. 1.
All emails were addressed to the individual recipient (e.g., ‘Dear
John’) and contained a corresponding logo related to the ﬁctitious or-
ganisation. As commonly found in phishing emails, each email also
contained a link within the text that recipients were encouraged to click
in order to respond to the email content. If recipients clicked on the
link, they were automatically directed to an internal, educational
website that informed them that they had clicked on a link within a
phishing simulation and were provided with access to further voluntary
online training and awareness-raising materials.
Each of the nine simulation emails were rated by two independent
raters according to the degree to which the email included authority
and urgency inﬂuence techniques. The content that was provided and
assessed by the raters focused on information within the email body
itself. This included the logo, the text of the email body, and the email
E.J. Williams et al. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 120 (2018) 1–13
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signature (as shown in Fig. 1). Raters were blind to the response rate
(known as the ‘click-rate’) for each of the emails. Speciﬁcally, emails
were rated on a scale of 1–3 (1= not at all; 2= slightly; 3= very
much) and raters were provided with standardised deﬁnitions to assist
them:
• To what extent does the email contain urgency-based inﬂuence techni-
ques?
Deﬁnition: The e-mail states that the receiver has a limited amount
of time to respond if they wish to engage with the e-mail content, such
as being time-limited, urgent or scarce. For example, ‘this link will
expire 24 h after this notiﬁcation has been read by you.’
• To what extent does the sender represent an authority ﬁgure or institu-
tion?
Deﬁnition: The email contains cues that suggest that the sender has
a degree of authority in relation to the recipient, such as the power to
enforce compliance or give orders. For example, an email claiming to be
from a senior ﬁgure within the organisation that requests individuals
comply with a request.
Inter-rater reliability was assessed using Cohen's kappa
(Dewey, 1983) and demonstrated good agreement between the two
raters (k=0.745, p< .001). For each phishing email, the score for
each inﬂuence technique was calculated as the mean of the two raters’
scores. These ratings are shown in Table 2.
In order to reduce the likelihood that any diﬀerences found between
emails were related to other factors, such as the perceived authenticity
of the email, all nine emails were also rated on the same 1–3 scale
according to (a) the extent to which the layout of the e-mail appears
genuine, (b) the extent to which the content of the e-mail appears
genuine, and (c) the extent to which the email is considered to be
trustworthy. For each of these aspects, all nine emails were rated > 1,
with the majority > 2 (except email seven, which had a mean rating of
1.5 for layout, and emails ﬁve and six, which both had a mean rating of
1.5 for trustworthiness).
2.2. Results
Click-rate data was analysed according to the particular simulation
email. Collapsed across email type, there was a mean click rate of
19.44% (Range=6.00%–35.00%; SD=11.85%), which reﬂects the
average response rate of 20% highlighted in the recent PhishMe report
(Computer Fraud and Security, 2016; PhishMe, 2016).
Due to a lack of data regarding which two emails employees re-
ceived, each data point was treated as coming from a separate parti-
cipant. For each of the four techniques, those emails that had a mean
rating > 1 were labelled as ‘technique present’ and those that had a
mean rating of 1 were labelled as ‘technique not present’.
To examine the relationship between the presence of authority and
urgency cues and mean click-rate, a binomial logistic regression was
conducted in R, with authority and urgency technique (present vs. not
present) as the predictor variables and response (link clicked vs. link
not clicked) as the dependent variable.
The results demonstrated that both authority and urgency were
associated with an increased likelihood of clicking on the email link
(Authority: Wald z-statistic=72.68, df=1, p<0.001, OR=3.42, CI
[3.31, 3.53]; Urgency: Wald z-statistic=39.12, df=1, p< .001,
OR=1.84, CI [1.79, 1.91]). This supports both hypothesis 1, that the
presence of urgency cues will be related to an increased likelihood of
responding to emails, and hypothesis 2, that the presence of authority
cues will be related to an increased likelihood of responding to emails.
For every one unit increase in authority rating, the log odds of clicking
on the email link was found to increase by 1.23. For every one unit
increase in urgency rating, the log odds of clicking on the email link was
found to increase by 0.61. Finally, examining the diﬀerence between
the residual deviance and null deviance allows performance of the
model based on these predictor variables to be compared with a null
model. The predictor variables were found to signiﬁcantly reduce the
residual deviance (null deviance=122,136, residual de-
viance=112,742, p< .001) compared to the null model, suggesting
that they both contribute to model performance. These results are
discussed in detail in Section 4: Discussion.
Email content is only one aspect likely to inﬂuence response beha-
viour, however. Since individual and situational-level factors could not
be examined using the available phishing simulation data, further in-
vestigation was required to explore the potential contribution of these
wider factors to employee response behaviour. Study Two was con-
ducted to examine these factors, using a focus group methodology to
explore employee perceptions of what inﬂuences their response beha-
viour.
Table 2
General mean click-rate (CR) according to simulation email.
Simulation email
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number sent 6,975 12,930 14,343 8,184 10,201 9,340 23,767 15,683 23,861
Number clicked 411 1089 4954 788 3303 2010 2190 5276 4737
CR 6% 8% 35% 10% 32% 21% 9% 34% 20%
Authority rating R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 2 R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 3 R1: 2
R2: 1 R2: 1 R2: 2 R2: 1 R2: 2 R2: 1 R2: 1 R2: 3 R2: 1
MR: 1 MR: 1 MR: 2 MR: 1 MR: 1.5 MR: 1 MR: 1 MR: 3 MR: 1.5
Urgency rating R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 2 R1: 1 R1: 2 R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 1 R1: 1
R2: 1 R2: 1 R2: 2 R2: 1 R2: 2 R2: 1 R2: 1 R2: 2 R2: 1
MR: 1 MR: 1 MR: 2 MR: 1 MR: 2 MR: 1 MR: 1 MR: 1.5 MR: 1
Note: R1=Rating of rater 1; R2=Rating of rater 2; MR=Mean Rating. Ratings in bold show emails included within ‘technique present’ group for each inﬂuence
technique.
Fig. 1. An example simulated phishing email.
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3. Study two
The aim of study two is twofold. First, to examine whether factors
external to the phishing message itself, such as aspects related to the
individual recipient or the context in which they are operating, are
likely to impact susceptibility to spear phishing within the workplace.
Second, to examine whether speciﬁc factors identiﬁed in current the-
oretical models of phishing susceptibility (e.g., the IPPM:
Vishwanath et al., 2011; the SCAM: Vishwanath et al., 2016; PMT:
Rogers, 1975; further detail of speciﬁc factors is provided in
Section 3.1.4: Thematic analysis) correspond with employee percep-
tions of their own susceptibility within the workplace. To address these
aims, we employ a qualitative focus group methodology to explore
employee perceptions of susceptibility to spear phishing emails. Spe-
ciﬁcally, six focus groups were conducted across two organisational
sites of a second organisation (further details are provided in 3.1.3.
Participants). These focused on examining employee perceptions of (a)
the factors that impact susceptibility to spear phishing emails at work,
(b) how they manage this susceptibility within the work environment,
and (c) the perceived eﬃcacy of current training approaches. In parti-
cular, the role of additional susceptibility factors external to the actual
inﬂuence techniques used, such as habitual email behaviours related to
work routines, phishing-related knowledge, and beliefs regarding
phishing risk, was explored (Ng et al, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016;
Vishwanath et al., 2016).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Materials
A standardised question plan was developed to explore employee
perceptions of their own susceptibility to spear phishing and how they
manage suspicious emails at work. This enabled us to investigate re-
sponses in relation to current models of susceptibility to phishing (e.g.,
Rogers, 1975; Vishwanath et al., 2016; Vishwanath et al., 2016). This
question plan was used as the basis for all focus groups and focused on
the following areas:
1. What factors make you more or less suspicious of an email that you
receive?
2. What factors make you more or less likely to respond to a targeted
phishing email?
3. What factors make you more or less likely to report an email that
you receive as potentially fraudulent?
4. What do you think about current training regarding phishing?
5. Anything else you would like to add regarding your interaction with
targeted phishing emails?
Although the primary emphasis of the focus groups was on ex-
ploring susceptibility to targeted ‘spear phishing’ emails, focus group
participants did make reference to generic phishing emails at various
points. This was particularly prevalent when considering what made
them trust an email. Where relevant, these points are highlighted in the
results section.
3.1.2. Procedure
A qualitative approach was taken to enable perceptions and ex-
periences to be captured and analysed according to the presence of
theoretically-driven themes (for further details, see Section 3.1.4:
Thematic analysis). This approach allowed us to take a more in-depth
approach to exploring susceptibility factors, as well as identifying as-
pects of current training that could be improved. The study was granted
ethical approval by the University's Research Ethics Committee (Ref.
FBL.15.11.015). Focus groups were held on-site in a private meeting
room. Two researchers were present at each focus group, with one fa-
cilitating the session and the second taking written notes. Each focus
group was recorded using a Dictaphone and transcribed following the
session. Any identifying information or reference to particular organi-
sational systems was removed on transcription. Participants were pro-
vided with full details of the research prior to the focus groups and also
provided informed written consent at the beginning of the focus group
session. It was made clear prior to the focus group session that parti-
cipation was voluntary and that participants could leave at any time
without having to give a reason. Participants were also informed of
general focus group etiquette prior to the start of the focus group. Thus,
we informed participants that (a) we were interested in hearing their
open and honest thoughts, (b) there were no right or wrong answers, (c)
what is said in the room should not be discussed outside of it, and (d)
that the session would be tape recorded, but individuals would remain
anonymous in transcription and reports. Contact details of the re-
searchers were also provided to enable participants to contact them in
the future if required.
3.1.3. Participants
Thirty-two employees of an international organisation operating
within the engineering and management sector (>10,000 total em-
ployees) participated in six focus groups conducted across two organi-
sational sites within the UK in April 2016. Each focus group contained
4–6 participants. Participants were recruited via internal communica-
tions inviting employees to participate in a voluntary focus group
conducted by university researchers to explore people's perceptions and
experiences of targeted phishing emails within the workplace.
Participants consisted of twelve males and twenty females and re-
presented administrative, engineering and project management job
roles. Further demographic information was not available to re-
searchers.
3.1.4. Thematic analysis
Thematic analysis is a qualitative method that allows for inter-
pretation of material to identify potential themes and patterns within
the data (Berg, 2006). We adopted a hybrid approach, which included
both inductive and deductive thematic analyses (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). This involved three main stages: 1) inductive themes
were deﬁned according to the study objectives and in line with previous
phishing susceptibility literature (e.g., the SCAM; Vishwanath et al.,
2016), 2) subcategories (codes) within each theme were deﬁned, and 3)
emergent subcategories that were deduced from the data were deﬁned.
To illustrate, “4. Knowledge and Training” was predeﬁned (and coded
as a primary theme), and the corresponding categories were alphabe-
tised, for instance, “4.a. Technical Understanding”. Emergent sub-
categories are highlighted with the corresponding codes, for instance
“4.b. understanding the security centre (emergent)”. The thematic fra-
mework is outlined as follows:
1. Trust or suspicion
Deﬁnition: Concepts and perceptions related to factors that make
someone consider that an email is likely to be legitimate or that
make them doubt its authenticity. Based primarily on research of
Vishwanath et al. (2011; 2016) and Williams et al. (2017b).
Codes: (a) Determining authenticity; (b) familiarity; (c) expecta-
tions; (d) work context.
2. Perceptions of spear phishing risk
Deﬁnition: Concepts and perceptions related to people's perceived
vulnerability to spear phishing within the work context, and the
perceived severity if this occurred. Based primarily on Protection
Motivation Theory concepts (e.g., Rogers, 1975; Tsai et al., 2016).
Codes: (a) Exposure to external emails (emergent); (b) centralised
inboxes (emergent); (c) risk awareness.
3. How susceptibility is managed
Deﬁnition: Factors related to the mechanisms that people use to help
them manage spear phishing emails in the workplace. Based pri-
marily on discussions with organisational security personnel.
Codes: (a) Warnings and banners; (b) reporting; (c) peer veriﬁcation
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(emergent); (d) avoidance (emergent).
4. Knowledge and training
Deﬁnition: Factors related to the degree of knowledge that people
have regarding spear phishing emails. Based primarily on research
of Vishwanath et al. (2016) and discussion with organisational se-
curity personnel.
Codes: (a) Technical understanding; (b) understanding the security
centre (emergent); (c) information overload (emergent); (d) per-
ceptions of training.
Two independent coders who were both present in the focus groups
analysed the dataset. Inter-rater reliability was assessed using Cohen's
kappa and demonstrated good agreement between the two raters
(k=0.890, p< .001). There were 21 instances where the two coders
coded the same information diﬀerently. These discrepancies were re-
solved through discussion between the coders and a third individual
who was not present in the focus groups but had knowledge of the
research area.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Theme 1: trust or suspicion
In all of the focus groups, the majority of participants had received
some form of phishing email, although these were often related to a
personal context rather than the work environment. These experiences
often reﬂected more generic phishing scams, whereby the content of the
email and sender address were highlighted as containing a number of
‘suspicious’ cues that were generally easy to identify, such as receiving
emails that claimed to be from a legitimate organisation but that came
from a personal email address: “at home you get ones like ‘inland revenue
at google.com’.” (FG6, P1). The majority of factors that were identiﬁed
as impacting trust of an email were applicable to both a home and work
context, with only some speciﬁc aspects reﬂecting the particular work
environment. These factors are discussed in more detail below.
(a) Determining authenticity
Particular aspects of an email that are used to determine authenti-
city were highlighted a total of 32 times across all six of the focus
groups, focusing primarily on actions such as hovering over the hy-
perlink and examining the sender address for errors, thus demon-
strating a degree of knowledge and awareness of how to identify
fraudulent emails. For example, “the easiest way I ﬁnd is to click on the
email address it comes from” (FG1, P2). Similarly, the presence of spel-
ling errors was consistently highlighted as a suspicious cue, “I had one
from Barclays before, it had the Barclays logo and everything and I think on
the ﬁrst or second paragraph they spelt Barclays wrong, so…” (FG6, P2). In
addition to these more speciﬁc elements, subjective judgments of
something feeling ‘not quite right’ were also considered, particularly
when other aspects of the email appeared legitimate. For example,
“something I always just can't ﬁgure out, you know, human nature, is when
they look ﬁne, almost too perfect, and there's something about them, but it
doesn't look like spam at all, it's just a lovely, perfectly worded email, bril-
liantly laid out and then you catch a feeling and think ‘why am I even
thinking about this?’, most emails you don't even question, but you get that
feel, bad vibe from it” (FG6, P2). A greater requirement to base decisions
on these subjective feelings was explicitly highlighted in roles where
more traditional cues, such as sender address, could not be relied upon.
For example, “I suppose that is it though, where they've come from. I mean I
work in procurement and you get legitimate enquiries wanting to be a sup-
plier and all that and it's often necessary to open the email to check that, that
sort of content, you can't just go by the address that it's come from ne-
cessarily… but they've usually got something not quite right in them, haven't
they, which rings alarm bells” (FG5, P5). The majority of these elements
were considered relevant to both spear phishing and generic phishing
emails, although the topic of the email was considered most relevant for
generic phishing (e.g., whether it represented a typical ‘419′ scam of-
fering vast sums of money).
(b) Familiarity
Relative familiarity with the sender or topic of emails that are re-
ceived was mentioned 10 times across ﬁve of the focus groups. For
instance, being unfamiliar with the sender of the message was con-
sidered an important cue by some participants, “I suppose I'm a bit
paranoid, if I don't know the person who sent it to me, even if it looks
genuine, if there's an attachment then I don't open it” (FG2, P2), although
this was more qualiﬁed in others, “if it's an unknown sender, I might be
suspicious” (FG5, P2). New employees who were not yet familiar with
the individuals that they would typically be liaising with were also
highlighted as potentially being more susceptible to phishing emails,
particularly those emails that established members of staﬀ would con-
sider relatively easy to identify. For example, “when I ﬁrst came here, I
was, because I wasn't familiar with what the companies were that were going
to email me necessarily I was just sort of clicking on anything … but it was
just because I wasn't familiar with the companies that we were dealing with”
(FG4, P2). Despite the use of familiarity as a potential cue to the le-
gitimacy of an email, the potential risks of familiar senders were also
highlighted by one participant, “they can be the hardest ones to spot
sometimes, if they're from a friend or contact and they've actually been
hacked haven't they and sometimes they can be the tricky ones to work out”
(FG1, P2).
(c) Expectations
Communications that were expected or considered routine were
also highlighted as less likely to trigger suspicion, being mentioned 26
times across all six focus groups. For instance, one participant discussed
receiving an email at “two minutes to midnight on a Saturday and we just
thought, you know, so we just sent it straight to [IT Security] here at the time
and said, you know, we never, no one would ever send us an email at that
time in the morning with this sort of heading on it” (FG2, P3).
However, the presence of expectations regarding communication
norms and what a legitimate message typically ‘looks like’ could also
lead to issues in itself. For instance, diﬃculty in identifying fraudulent
emails that exploit these expectations and routines was explicitly
highlighted by one participant in relation to a colleague who had re-
ceived a spear phishing email regarding an unpaid invoice from a le-
gitimate email account: “it's a company she deals with, we've currently got
problems with accounts payable … and actually why would she not believe
that it was true” (FG1, P4). Particular expectations regarding commu-
nication norms were also highlighted as leading to diﬃculties in in-
ternational working environments. For instance, diﬀerent email styles
and communication norms across diﬀerent countries could make it
more diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate legitimate emails from spear phishing
emails: “I mean there are some places, you do get, you get some emails from
America and they write in a diﬀerent way and it does make it diﬃcult
sometimes to sort of spot the diﬀerence” (FG6, P5).
(d) The work context
The role of the work context in inﬂuencing responses was high-
lighted 13 times across all of the six focus groups. The impact of being
busy on the depth of information processing that was possible was
highlighted in the comments of one participant, “I think that you're still
likely to click on something because we're all really busy and I think that you
sort of scan stuﬀ don't you, and if you see something attached you might just
click and think ‘oh well, I'll have a look at the other information’, you don't
always have lots of time” (FG1, P4). Similarly, another participant stated
“Yes, if it was out of my sphere of what I was doing, say I was doing, I don't
know [project related task] and I got an e-mail about something else I'd
think, ‘why do they want to know that?’ but again if you're very, very busy
E.J. Williams et al. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 120 (2018) 1–13
6
then I might just click on it by accident” (FG2, P1). This issue was also
highlighted by one participant as being particularly relevant in smaller
businesses, who may not have the IT support and reporting infra-
structure to allow people to easily verify the legitimacy of emails if they
do have concerns, “everyone's way too busy, so you know ‘I haven't got time
to check that’ so, I don't know, they [larger businesses] may have people who
it might be their entire job to check these emails which is great, but then, for
other people, a smaller business, where they don't have that, they don't have
that kind of support” (FG6, P2).
3.2.2. Theme 2: perceptions of spear phishing risk
The extent to which participants were exposed to spear phishing
emails within the work context varied substantially, with some parti-
cipants reporting that, (to their knowledge) they had never received a
phishing email of any kind whilst at work, whilst others reported re-
ceiving targeted emails on a regular basis. This exposure appeared to be
impacted by the extent to which individuals received external emails
within their job role and the use of centralised inboxes. Those with
greater exposure to spear phishing also demonstrated a greater degree
of awareness regarding how to report phishing emails, as well as the
risk of being targeted by spear phishing emails within the workplace.
These factors are discussed in more detail below.
(a) Exposure to external emails
Exposure to external emails was discussed eight times across ﬁve of
the focus groups. If individuals did not regularly receive external
emails, then receiving such an email was highlighted as a primary
trigger for suspicion in the work context:
“P3: we shouldn't also get ones from outside inﬂuences
P2: no
P3: the external ones, for example, we shouldn't get on a day to day
basis, it should be from [internal] personnel and that would ﬂag it up for
me…
P1: yeah, [internal] are the only ones we should be getting, unless you're
doing a task outside
P3: yeah”.
(FG2)
For employees who regularly received external emails, it was con-
sidered more diﬃcult to determine the authenticity of an email. As
stated by one participant, “ours will be from everywhere, because we buy
an awful lot of stuﬀ from outside companies, [organisation] and what have
you, I've noticed more and more emails are coming through which I just put
as junk, junk, junk, but yeah and we have so much coming through that it
could be easy to click on something” (FG2, P4). Such diﬃculties were also
highlighted by a call-centre based employee, “we get 200–300 emails a
day, so knowing when to click on something and when not to click on
something is quite hard because we get purchase orders coming through and
we've got to click on the attachment” (FG5, P1).
The substantial variation in exposure to spear phishing across job
roles was reﬂected in employees’ relative awareness of the relevant
processes and procedures, such as how to report a suspected phishing
email, with those who regularly encountered potentially fraudulent
emails or regularly reported emails as suspicious appearing to be more
familiar with the reporting process. As highlighted by one participant
who did not regularly encounter ‘suspicious’ emails, “to be honest I
wouldn't know, I don't generally get phishing emails at work and I wouldn't
know who to report it to, the IT department I guess” (FG1, P2).
(b) Centralised inboxes
Job roles that involved use of a centralised inbox were also high-
lighted in two of the focus groups as increasing exposure to potential
phishing emails: “we get them, sort of, every day because we have several
centralised inboxes, so we'll get a phishing email every single day” (FG5,
P1). Similarly, “I mean I haven't had it here, but when I worked in a dif-
ferent building we had our co-owned little email address, I used to get quite a
few, you know, sort of unsolicited ones and I thought, always forwarded
them on and they came back to me and said no it was ok but thank you…”
(FG1, P5). These emails could include both generic phishing and tar-
geted phishing emails. For the latter, other cues that would traditionally
raise suspicion, such as an unexpected contact, were also deemed to be
lacking due to the unsolicited nature of some messages, thereby in-
creasing the reliance on external veriﬁcation and reporting procedures.
For instance, “its very diﬃcult for us because I think our inbox allows every
single thing you could imagine come through, whereas, personal [personal
inbox], I've only ever had one come through on that, but our centralised one
we have to allow anyone to pop an email in that so it gets quite diﬃcult”
(FG5, P1).
(c) Risk awareness
Diﬀerences in perceptions and awareness of risk were referenced 16
times across four of the focus groups. This was explicitly highlighted by
one focus group participant, “I don't think it's something that is well un-
derstood … I think it's mixed, you've got people who are very clear about it
and you've got people who aren't so clear… or aren't so clear on what their
regular routines and habits and ways of dealing with emails might cause… I
think that there's a spectrum of awareness around it” (FG3, P1).
Diﬀerences were also highlighted according to perceptions of risk
and vulnerability within a personal (i.e., home) context compared to a
work context. In particular, the work environment was perceived as
more secure, with enhanced technical controls making it less likely that
suspicious emails would be encountered (although this was dependent
on the job role), and the provision of specialist support to reduce the
impact if a phishing email was responded to. For instance, one parti-
cipant questioned “are we distinguishing between work and home perhaps,
because I think at work it's not so prevalent because this should be a better
system in place for it hopefully” (FG5, P2), whilst another highlighted
“that's a good thing about work though, as it's a good system so a lot of them
get blocked, so we don't generally get much spam or kind of stuﬀ through the
work email address, with my [personal] account I get a big problem with
that” (FG1, P1). In contrast, perceptions of vulnerability in a personal
context appeared to vary substantially, with some participants de-
monstrating a high degree of conﬁdence in their ability to manage
phishing emails of all types and others feeling much more vulnerable.
For example, “see I feel quite comfortable with them at work, they'll let me
know not to open it, at home… you just don't know what to do” (FG4, P4).
3.2.3. Theme 3: how susceptibility is managed
When discussing the potential risk from spear phishing within the
workplace, employees highlighted a number of assistance mechanisms
and aides that they used to manage this risk in their day-to-day en-
vironment. This ranged from online warnings and email banners to
reporting mechanisms and discussion with peers.
(a) Warnings and banners
The perceived beneﬁt of technical-based aids for focusing attention
and invoking suspicion were highlighted nine times across all six focus
group, with particular reference to the use of email banners to en-
courage users to engage in more systematic consideration of the email.
For example, “now they have an external email banner, which helps be-
cause it does make you think to look at it more and don't click on anything”
(FG2, P4). The provision of security alerts was also considered to in-
crease awareness of particular threats, providing a means to match
emails received with a mental representation of a known phishing
threat and making it less likely that such emails would be considered
genuine.
“P4: they tend to send like an alert saying if you get something from this
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speciﬁc address or saying this, some people have been targeted … which
is quite useful, so you can at least see the body of the text and go ‘ah
yeah, if I see something like that’…
P3: yeah, that's a good thing
P2: yeah, that's all I generally see, are alerts saying watch out for this”.
(FG1)
(b) Reporting
The use of reporting procedures to determine the legitimacy of
emails was discussed 40 times across all six focus groups. The ease of
reporting potential phishing emails, and the provision of timely and
reliable feedback in relation to the legitimacy of these emails, was
highlighted as helping employees make the correct decision regarding
emails that they were uncertain about. For instance, “there's a spam
reporting email that they've got set up, you just attach it to that, send it oﬀ,
wait for it to come back telling you whether it is or not” (FG2, P4) and
“yeah, we just send them oﬀ to another email address and then it comes back
to us saying it wasn't malicious or whatever” (FG5, P1). Receiving con-
sistent and timely feedback was seen as vital to make sure that people
did not consider their reporting actions a waste of time and thus be less
likely to report emails in the future, “yeah, if you're not getting any
feedback at all then you'll stop forwarding them on, make you think ‘are they
paying any attention?” (FG1, P2) and “I guess I might be more resistant to
send it oﬀ if I think it takes two days to get back and for them to say ‘oh you
can open it’ and then I'm two days behind in my work” (FG6, P2). A
number of participants also highlighted other factors that may reduce
the likelihood of reporting, such as a fear of potential negative re-
percussions, “I just know people who haven't wanted to report things be-
cause they thought they would get into trouble for clicking on something”
(FG2, P2), not considering it important, “if I see something I'm not ex-
pecting to get I'd probably just delete it without opening it up. I don't think I'd
report it to anyone” (FG5, P3), and the potential time involved, “the ﬁrst
time I got one I thought, in the back of my mind, there was a ‘we're meant to
report all spam, aren't we’ but I had to go on [intranet] and Google, well,
search, for how to do it. It's not the easiest thing to ﬁnd on [intranet], if it's
something that happens so rarely you're not going to remember” (FG6, P3).
(c) Peer veriﬁcation
The role of peer support in verifying emails, such as speaking to
colleagues, sharing tips or getting advice from others with regards to
decision-making in conditions of uncertainty, was also discussed 11
times across ﬁve of the focus groups. In particular, the extent that other
members of staﬀ also received a particular email appears to inﬂuence
decision-making.
“P3: so when you pass it around, you say ‘have you seen that email’ and
you say ‘yeah, what did you do with it?’, ‘delete it’, ‘I'm sending it on’,
you know that comes round in the oﬃce quite often, you know in an
oﬃce with [x] people sitting around and all of a sudden you all get this
email and you think it must be phishing if we've all got it.
P6: but then, if it was just you then you might be less sure, you know
‘have you got this?’ ‘no’, it might be phishing, but it might not, so you'd
still be on your guard but less so I guess, I don't know”.
(FG2)
This social veriﬁcation was considered particularly relevant for new
staﬀ, who may be uncertain regarding communication norms within
their job role, and for those who did not regularly receive suspicious
emails. For instance, one participant recounted receiving a particular
email in the oﬃce, “I was like, hey [name], I've got an email, this is exciting
it's from [name department] and he was like, ‘don't click it’ and I was like
‘oh, sorry” (FG6, P4). Similarly, another participant recounted a similar
incident, “I said to my colleague, ‘oh, I don't really understand’, and she
said, ‘oh my god, don't open it, don't open any attachments, send it on to the
spam’, so I was like ‘oops, thank you” (FG4, P2). However, staﬀ groups
who do not have access to such informal support mechanisms, such as
remote workers or those working oﬀ-site when an email is received,
may be at particular risk in this regard.
(d) Avoidance
Avoiding engaging in activities that may increase the risk of falling
victim to a phishing attack, such as refusing to click on links within any
email received, was also highlighted as a means of reducing suscept-
ibility across three of the focus groups. However, this strategy could
only be used if the email or link was not perceived as necessary for work
activities. For example, “I don't click on anything if I can help it. I don't
click on anything, even if it looks legitimate, unless I feel I need to do that for
my work… how do you know, I mean, how do you know it's safe?” (FG3,
P6). In scenarios of goal conﬂict, therefore, where an email is con-
sidered important or necessary for a work task, such strategies may
prove diﬃcult to enact.
3.2.4. Theme 4: knowledge and training
Finally, a number of factors were highlighted regarding the degree
of knowledge that employees have about both spear phishing and
phishing in general, including how and why user information may be
gained and used, how security systems manage the phishing risk, and
the perceived eﬀectiveness of training in this area.
(a) Technical understanding
A number of issues were raised in focus group discussions that re-
ﬂected uncertainty regarding what spear phishing encompasses, how
personal information may be gathered and used in spear phishing at-
tacks, and potential trajectories of impact within a system if such an
email is responded to (i.e., once a link has been clicked or user cre-
dentials entered). Overall, this was referenced 12 times over ﬁve focus
groups. For instance, “regards to everybody in the company, what, if you
asked the question to someone in the company, what is phishing, … they'd
say ‘I know its something to do with emails’, but what is, you know, what is
spam, ‘well, they're all the same aren't they?’ well, they're not, you know, so
maybe we need to tell people exactly what each thing is and the key things to
looking out for them” (FG2, P3) and “So, I don't think that people actually
know what happens if you do accidentally click on something” (FG3, P4).
Aiding individuals to gain greater understanding of both the con-
sequences of their potential actions and how these consequences can be
mitigated at each stage was considered important, “I think it might be
worth when they're doing the training taking a hypothetical scenario saying
right Miss A is sitting at her desk and she clicks on this, this is what it's
opening up, this is here it's going to, this is what it's leading to, this could be
the consequences, so you can see how one click… could almost bring down a
company. I don't think people realise just how consequential it can be” (FG4,
P4).
(b) Understanding the security centre
Uncertainty regarding technical security systems, including how
these work and how they are operated, was highlighted seven times
across four of the focus groups. For instance, uncertainty regarding the
vulnerabilities of technical systems was highlighted by one participant:
“I think I have an expectation now that we're a [particular type of company]
our IT department should be able to deal with most sort of, attempted attacks
on our systems, so I sit there thinking well I don't need to worry about it too
much… for me, they should be the ones maybe where the investment is to try
and stop as many as they can, because by the time they get to us it's kind of
failed all of the diﬀerent sort of checks that must be in place” (FG1, P4).
Uncertainty regarding the degree to which processes can be, and are,
automated was also considered. For instance, “what I don't know is what
the process is for, once you've reported it, is there a physical person that has
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to check it, or is there some sort of automated system, because depending on,
if I was reporting sort of one a day I think I might feel I'm overloading this
poor person with all these emails” (FG6, P3).
(c) Information overload
In order to enhance and maintain employee awareness of spear
phishing attacks, communication materials may be regularly circulated
to employees via a range of mechanisms (e.g., posters in corridors, in-
formation on noticeboards, intranet articles etc.). However, when
combined with the vast array of other information that must also be
routinely circulated to employees, such as health and safety informa-
tion and site-speciﬁc news, this was considered easy to miss or forget.
The issue of an overload of protective information of various sorts was
highlighted ﬁve times across ﬁve of the focus groups.
“P4: we do get bombarded with quite a lot of diﬀerent things about se-
curity and health and safety
P5: see that's the thing, which all come through on email so it's clogging
up your email, making it worse, so you just randomly go through thinking
‘that'll do’
P4: and also on the noticeboards, I think we're probably a bit blind to it
…
P2: I think that in our speciﬁc area we do get a lot of security things so,
yeah, some of it might get missed or forgotten”.
(FG1)
(d) Perceptions of training
The eﬃcacy of current training was considered 26 times across the
six focus groups. When considering current training, the majority of
participants perceived this in relation to a ‘tick-box’ exercise, with in-
dividuals completing online modules either when they are short on time
or overloaded by information from other courses (e.g., during the in-
duction period). This was considered to result in the information ‘not
going in’, suggesting that training content is not suﬃciently processed
to ensure that it can be easily recalled when required.
P1: they [people] just want to get their pass and then forget everything
about it, that's the main thing
P3: yeah
P5: most people just go to the assessment at the end and never actually…
and don't bother actually reading it all”.
(FG1)
Current training approaches were generally considered to be too
static and unresponsive to the changing cyber domain. For instance,
“the variation is not that great, you know everybody's saying on the news
and everything else, this is getting worse and worse and worse, but the
questions are the same as we had last year” (FG2, P1). Overall, partici-
pants highlighted a number of suggestions for improving current
training approaches in order to more eﬀectively address perceived
susceptibility factors. These included:
• Providing greater detail
• Regularly updating content
• Allocating speciﬁc time to complete training outside of the primary
job role
• Using a range of interactive methods (particularly discussion-based
activities)
• Ensuring personal relevance.
Potential implications of these suggestions for practitioners are
discussed within Section 4.2: Implications for Designers and User
Communities.
4. Discussion
These studies explored the factors that inﬂuence susceptibility to
spear phishing emails within the workplace. Study One used historic
phishing simulation data to examine the impact of message factors,
speciﬁcally the presence of authority and urgency inﬂuence techniques
within the email, on susceptibility to phishing within an ecologically
valid context. In line with our hypotheses, signiﬁcantly higher click-
rates were found for phishing simulations that contained authority and
urgency cues. Study Two was then conducted to examine the potential
role of factors external to the message itself on employee susceptibility,
with a particular focus on perceptions of spear phishing risk, degree of
knowledge, work-related routines and norms. This allowed the inﬂu-
ence of context, speciﬁcally that of the work environment, to be ex-
plored in a novel and practically relevant way. Applying concepts from
theoretical models to data collected in an organisational setting not
only provides a degree of validation within applied contexts, but also
aids theoretical development through the identiﬁcation of additional
concepts of interest. Overall, the primary factors highlighted in current
theoretical models of phishing susceptibility were supported. A number
of additional factors speciﬁc to work contexts were also identiﬁed, in-
cluding degree of exposure to external emails, the use of centralised
inboxes, information overload within the work environment, and the
role of social and technical support in enhancing perceptions of self-
eﬃcacy. This provides a basis for the further development of current
theoretical approaches (Ng et al, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016; Vishwanath
et al., 2011; Vishwanath et al., 2016), as well as a number of practical
recommendations relating to interface design, employee training and
awareness, and decision support systems. These are discussed in more
detail below.
4.1. Theoretical implications
4.1.1. Understanding message-related factors: the IPPM
When considering what makes people susceptible to phishing
emails, the IPPM claims that inﬂuence techniques contained within
such emails (such as an urgent deadline) distract people's limited at-
tentional resources away from important authenticity information
(such as the accuracy of the sender address; Vishwanath et al., 2011).
Within the reported research, we found that the presence of common
inﬂuence techniques within spear phishing emails (speciﬁcally, urgency
and authority cues) contribute to increased susceptibility within a
workplace setting, likely by encouraging the use of heuristic processing
strategies (Vishwanath et al., 2011). Since the IPPM was primarily
developed and tested within a university population, these ﬁndings
provide novel evidence that such concepts also apply within a work-
place domain where employees have previously received a base level of
cyber security training.
Interestingly, when participants within Study Two considered the
factors that they believe inﬂuence their email response behaviour, the
speciﬁc inﬂuence techniques highlighted in study one (i.e., authority
and urgency) were not mentioned. Instead, participants focused pre-
dominantly on whether they were familiar with the message sender,
whether they were expecting the communication, and the presence of
authenticity information, such as a correct sender address. To a degree,
this is unsurprising since it has previously been acknowledged that
familiar information is more likely to be considered legitimate due to
increased accessibility of that information within memory processes
(Begg et al., 1992; Polage, 2012). However, although it is possible that
participants implicitly considered aspects related to authority inﬂuence
techniques when discussing authenticity information, this was not
stated and does not consider other inﬂuence techniques, such as ur-
gency. This suggests that individuals may be unaware of their vulner-
ability to the inﬂuence techniques commonly contained within spear
phishing emails, representing a gap in current knowledge. As a result,
although employees identiﬁed authenticity cues as a means to identify
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spear phishing emails, these strategies may fail if the email contains
well-crafted inﬂuence techniques or if they are operating within a
pressured cognitive context at the time that the message is received
(Williams et al., 2017a). This is in line with the heuristic processing
propositions of the IPPM and the ﬁndings of study one.
Within current models, the degree of correspondence between what
an individual perceives to inﬂuence their judgements (i.e., sender ad-
dress etc.) and what is actually found to inﬂuence them (i.e., the pre-
sence of authority or urgency cues) is not currently speciﬁed. The
ﬁndings of our study suggest that there is currently a dissonance be-
tween these two aspects. Susceptibility to inﬂuence techniques may
thus be driven by either a lack of understanding regarding how such
cues can be used within spear phishing emails or a lack of under-
standing of our own vulnerability to such cues. Future work should
directly address these possibilities. In particular, whether greater
knowledge of inﬂuence techniques reduces their persuasive eﬀect or
whether such techniques are capable of encouraging heuristic proces-
sing irrespective of the degree of awareness that an individual has.
4.1.2. Risk beliefs, knowledge and habits: the SCAM
The SCAM proposes that the beliefs that an individual has regarding
online risk and their established habits of behaviour inﬂuence the in-
formation processing style that is employed when an email is en-
countered (Vishwanath et al., 2016). Within study two, work-related
norms and routines, online risk beliefs, and degree of knowledge, were
all explicitly highlighted by employees as likely to inﬂuence their sus-
ceptibility to spear phishing.
A number of examples of spear phishing emails exploiting habits
and routines were identiﬁed. These were likely to encourage a reliance
on heuristic processing strategies, eﬀectively slipping under the radar
and leading to individuals clicking automatically whilst engaged in
their usual job routine. For example, an email matching prior ex-
pectations was considered to increase the likelihood that a quick
‘scanning’ of email content would occur. Emails were also identiﬁed
that mimicked familiar senders or ‘usual’ subjects, making it less likely
that they would ‘stand out’ from other communications that are re-
ceived (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Taylor and Fiske, 1978). Unless an
email is perceived to be abnormal in some way, it is unlikely to trigger
more in-depth, systematic processing and the additional time and
mental resource that this involves (Vishwanath et al., 2016). Although
some people reported being generally more suspicious of emails than
others (in line with ﬁndings of Harrison et al., 2016b), suspicion was
also often triggered by particular norms related to the individual's job
role. For instance, employees who did not routinely receive external
emails highlighted this as a ‘red ﬂag’, whereas those who regularly
received legitimate external emails had to use other triggers to guide
decision making, such as whether the email countered expectations.
These decision processes appear to be primarily related to diﬀerences in
the degree of exposure to phishing emails within the work context, with
employees who more regularly receive spear phishing emails high-
lighting the use of more considered processing strategies in order to
counter the perceived risk. Finally, work-related pressures that were
considered a routine part of the work environment, such as being in-
terrupted during a work task (Hodgetts and Jones, 2006), being
otherwise distracted or in a rush (INFOSEC Institute, 2013; Miarmi and
DeBono, 2007), or being cognitively fatigued in some way (Vohs et al.,
2008), were also considered to increase susceptibility.
Although some of these aspects are accounted for by the role of
email habits and experience highlighted by Vishwanath et al. (2016),
our ﬁndings suggest that a wider consideration of ‘norms and routines’
should be included within theoretical models that explicitly accounts
for (a) the degree of familiarity with communication types, (b) prior
expectations regarding speciﬁc communications, and (c) context-in-
duced cognitive pressure within the work environment. For instance,
cognitive pressure is likely to increase reliance on heuristic processing
and therefore should increase susceptibility. Conversely, particular
communication expectations within a job role could result both in de-
creased susceptibility to phishing emails that counter these expecta-
tions, and increased susceptibility to spear phishing emails that exploit
these expectations. Systematic investigation of the relative inﬂuence of
these various factors on response behaviour and how they may interact
across diﬀerent contexts is required.
Finally, the SCAM claims that increased knowledge and experience
regarding phishing will contribute to more accurate cyber risk beliefs,
thus reducing the likelihood that individuals will rely on heuristic
processing strategies. Spear phishing emails represent a particularly
diﬃcult to spot attack, and if individuals do not have relevant experi-
ence of targeted phishing emails (whether through direct experience or
education / training), they may be particularly vulnerable to emails
that do not match ‘typical phishing’ stereotypes. This was evident in the
wide range of phishing knowledge demonstrated across participants,
with some demonstrating a high degree of understanding regarding
how various forms of information can be used to design a spear
phishing attack and others unfamiliar with potential spear phishing
risks. Again, participants with greater exposure to spear phishing emails
within the workplace appeared to demonstrate greater knowledge and
more accurate understanding of phishing risks. When assessing the risk
of becoming the victim of a spear phishing email, individuals are likely
to make judgements about their vulnerability based on previous ex-
perience and information regarding the experiences of those around
them (Barnett and Breakwell, 2001). As such, those who do not gen-
erally encounter phishing emails of any kind within their job role may
consider themselves less vulnerable to phishing more generally. Un-
fortunately, this may make them less likely to consider the possibility
that an email may be fraudulent if they are ever actually targeted.
However, it is also possible that those who regularly receive particular
types of spear phishing emails may indeed be more adept at identifying
suspicious emails that match these expectations, but may be more
susceptible to those that do not. Our ﬁndings suggest that these relative
diﬀerences in exposure, and their resultant impact on phishing-related
knowledge, risk perceptions, and context-speciﬁc suspicion should be
further investigated and accounted for in current theoretical models
(Rogers, 1975; Vishwanath et al., 2016).
4.1.3. Coping with spear phishing in the workplace: PMT
PMT (Rogers, 1975) posits that individuals will engage in a parti-
cular protective behaviour if they feel that the threat is suﬃcient and
they feel able to enact the protective action (self-eﬃcacy). Within Study
Two, a number of technical and other support mechanisms and aides
were identiﬁed by participants as reducing perceived risk in their day-
to-day environment and helping them to cope with spear phishing in
the workplace. These included technical-based aids (warnings and
banners), IT reporting mechanisms, and peer veriﬁcation. Interestingly,
these reﬂected the predominant susceptibility factors highlighted by
current theoretical models (Ng et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 2016;
Vishwanath et al., 2011, 2016). For instance, technical design solutions
often direct an individual's attention to elements of the message that
may raise suspicion, such as online warnings and external email ban-
ners (Modic and Anderson, 2014). Such approaches have the potential
to override greater attentional focus on the inﬂuence techniques con-
tained within the message content. Similarly, mechanisms of verifying
initial suspicions via expert feedback or discussion with peers provide
feedback regarding current risks in the workplace (Woolley et al.,
2010). This may be particularly beneﬁcial for users who lack in-depth
knowledge and may not feel suﬃciently conﬁdent to risk not re-
sponding to an email in case it is legitimate. The presence of inﬂuence
techniques that invoke compliance with authority or urgency cues may
exacerbate this further, whereby signalling distrust of the email could
be perceived as carrying a potential cost with regards to the message
sender or scenario (ten Brinke, Vohs and Carney, 2016).
Overall, the range of assistance mechanisms highlighted within
Study Two portray the range of ways in which employees attempt to
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manage perceived vulnerability to spear phishing at work. These ﬁnd-
ings also extend the PMT concept of self-eﬃcacy within the online se-
curity domain by identifying particular mechanisms through which self-
eﬃcacy may be enhanced (i.e., online warnings and banners, expert
feedback, peer veriﬁcation). For instance, email warnings and banners
may increase perceived ability to identify a spear phishing email by
assisting people to identify suspicious elements of a communication
(e.g., an external sender) and match incoming emails with known
phishing attacks. Conversely, expert feedback and peer veriﬁcation
provide support for those who are not conﬁdent in their ability to detect
a spear phishing attack by providing a means to independently verify
any doubts or suspicions that they may have.
Finally, a small number of employees also highlighted avoiding
clicking on any links within emails as a risk-reduction strategy.
However, this strategy could only be used if the email or link was not
perceived as necessary for work activities, highlighting the precarious
balance between operational and security requirements within the
work environment (Kainda et al., 2010). In scenarios of goal conﬂict,
where an email is considered as potentially important or necessary for a
work task, such strategies may prove diﬃcult to enact. This may lead to
ﬁnal response decisions being dependent on the particular organisa-
tional security culture within which the employee is operating (Rocha-
Flores and Ekstedt, 2016), their perception of the relative risks of
clicking on a particular link (Ng et al, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016;
Vishwanath et al., 2016), and the extent to which the email reﬂects
current work-related demands and pressures. As a result, such avoid-
ance strategies may actually represent a maladaptive form of coping
that is enacted when perceived self-eﬃcacy to eﬀectively identify a
spear phishing email is low and alternative veriﬁcation strategies are
not considered eﬀective or timely. Our ﬁndings suggest that the po-
tential inﬂuence of work context, and the assistance mechanisms that it
does (or does not) provide, on perceived self-eﬃcacy should be further
investigated. In particular, survey approaches that assess self-eﬃcacy
both before and after exposure to particular assistance mechanisms, and
its relationship with actual detection ability, would be beneﬁcial.
4.2. Implications for designers and user communities
There is continuing debate regarding the utility of phishing simu-
lations within organisational contexts, with suggestions that such ap-
proaches fail to address the complexity of phishing vulnerability and
contribute to the development of negative, blame-based security cul-
tures (National Cyber Security Centre, 2018b). The ﬁndings of this
paper highlight the complex nature of susceptibility to phishing within
the workplace. If eﬀective mitigations are to be developed, it is ne-
cessary to ﬁrst understand the underlying causes and mechanisms
driving response behaviour. It is increasingly clear that a one-size-ﬁts-
all approach is unlikely to be suﬃcient, with the wider message, in-
dividual and context-related factors identiﬁed in this paper requiring
attention. For instance, employees were found to display large variation
in their exposure to spear phishing emails within the work environ-
ment, primarily driven by the extent to which they received external
emails, with staﬀ groups who regularly deal with external suppliers
having the most experience of both receiving and reporting spear
phishing and generic phishing emails. Whereas this increased exposure
could lead to increased susceptibility in such groups, it could also result
in enhanced awareness of the risks of spear phishing and how to deal
with it, due to the regular requirement to make decisions regarding
message legitimacy.
Responding to these diﬀerent exposure patterns may require the
development of adaptive user interfaces that respond to the likely
awareness of users, with those who are less regularly exposed to
phishing emails requiring diﬀerent system sign-posting. For instance,
less aware users may respond favourably to periodic reminders of the
phishing threat and how to report phishing emails. Conversely, more
aware users may beneﬁt from regular updates regarding evolving
phishing tactics in order to counter any potential stereotypes that may
develop through repeated exposure to similar targeted phishing emails
(e.g., invoice scams). In order to achieve this, an in-depth analysis of
the potential impact of particular job roles on phishing susceptibility
using existing human factors tools, such as task analysis (Kirwan and
Ainsworth, 1992) may be of beneﬁt in identifying and mitigating likely
risk factors for diﬀerent staﬀ groups.
To enhance and maintain employee awareness of phishing attacks,
communication materials are often circulated to employees via a range
of mechanisms (e.g., posters in corridors, information on noticeboards,
intranet articles etc.). However, it is well established that an in-
dividual's attentional resources are limited (see Kahneman, 1973), with
restrictions on the amount of information that cognitive systems can
process at any one time. When these materials are combined with the
vast array of other information that must also be routinely circulated to
employees, such as health and safety information and site-speciﬁc
news, this can reduce the likelihood and extent that such information
will (a) be noticed, and (b) be remembered or applied when making
decisions regarding the legitimacy of emails. This issue is also likely to
be accentuated by other aspects of the work environment, such as a
perceived lack of time to undertake tasks outside of the primary job
role, which can lead to additional information not being prioritised. The
allocation of speciﬁc time to interact with such information, or the use
of more creative, interactive methods to disseminate information, may
provide an initial means to counteract this issue.
The use of decision aids, such as external email banners and threat
updates, was also highlighted as providing valuable assistance in
drawing individuals’ attention to potential risks when an email is ﬁrst
received. Once doubt has been invoked with regards to the legitimacy
of the email, reporting mechanisms were highlighted as providing a
means to verify suspicions and receive feedback on judgements. The
consistent provision of such feedback was considered important to en-
sure that those who reported emails did not consider their actions to be
a waste of time, and therefore would continue to use reporting me-
chanisms in the future. Whilst all personnel should have access to
formal support mechanisms, access to the more informal processes that
were highlighted, such as peer veriﬁcation and support, is likely to be
limited in certain staﬀ groups (e.g., remote workers or those working
oﬀ-site). As such, ensuring that all staﬀ can access consistent technical
feedback when required should be combined with a further con-
sideration of potential options for supporting remote staﬀ groups using
informal online support tools, such as the development of speciﬁc in-
ternal forums or remote communication functions.
Finally, a number of perceived knowledge gaps also emerged that
may impact susceptibility to spear phishing attacks. Speciﬁcally, these
focused on (a) the degree of understanding of the technical mechanisms
involved when a potential phishing email is responded to (e.g., when a
malicious link is clicked on), (b) the potential impact of responding to
such an email, including the likely trajectory of such impacts and how
these impacts can be mitigated, and (c) the degree of understanding of
the limitations of technical solutions and security systems, such as email
ﬁlters, so that users perceive themselves as a vital component of such
systems, in line with socio-technical approaches (Sasse et al., 2007). By
empowering individuals with greater understanding of both the con-
sequences of their potential actions and how these consequences can be
mitigated at each stage, uncertainty regarding the phishing threat may
be reduced (Ng et al, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016). Such approaches should
also target understanding of how seemingly innocent information may
be used in the development of a targeted phishing attack, such as
providing the contact details of an employee to a social engineer or
displaying information on social media. This knowledge is also directly
applicable to a personal context, where employees may perceive
themselves as more vulnerable due to increased exposure to a range of
phishing and spear phishing emails and reduced availability of spe-
cialist support when deciding how to respond (Ng et al, 2009;
Tsai et al., 2016).
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The degree of technical knowledge that an individual has regarding
the vulnerabilities of technical systems may also impact their under-
standing of the importance of human users as a secondary line of de-
fence, and therefore their perceptions of both susceptibility and re-
sponsibility with regards to spear phishing (Ng et al, 2009; Tsai et al.,
2016; Vishwanath et al., 2016). By focusing on the development of
collaboration with security in order to achieve mutual goals (i.e., to
reduce the phishing threat), uncertainties regarding the role and op-
erations of security functions may be reduced and a greater under-
standing of the vulnerabilities of security systems developed. Con-
sideration should also be given regarding how knowledge of these areas
can be encouraged via other means, such as through the design of
current system interfaces that may communicate this information in a
visual manner at the time that the user interacts with an email.
4.3. Limitations and future work
It should be considered that this paper only reﬂects data from two
organisations, and therefore further work is required to build on these
ﬁndings and explore the extent that they are reﬂected in other orga-
nisations. This is particularly relevant for the ﬁndings of Study Two,
since employee perceptions and experiences are likely to be impacted
by a range of factors that may be speciﬁc to the organisation studied.
Secondly, the extent that these perceptions reﬂect actual employee
behaviour when faced with a spear phishing email would also beneﬁt
from further investigation in a more controlled setting. However, a
number of factors identiﬁed relate directly to susceptibility concepts
that have previously been examined in laboratory settings or using
university populations. Thirdly, it should be noted that recruitment to
the focus groups was based on voluntary participation, which could
have skewed the sample to employees who were more knowledgeable
or had a greater interest in this area. However, a wide range of
awareness and knowledge levels and opinions related to phishing was
demonstrated in discussions.
Finally, the use of historic phishing simulation data in Study One
represents a novel approach in exploring phishing susceptibility in
applied settings and provides a unique method for exploring the impact
of message-related factors on response behaviour. However, this meant
that it was not possible to counterbalance the particular inﬂuence
techniques used within phishing emails, making it more diﬃcult to
assess these factors as individual constructs. Similarly, it was not pos-
sible to access demographic data regarding respondent attributes (e.g.,
age, cyber security knowledge, job role etc.). The availability of only
nine simulated phishing emails also reduced the number of inﬂuence
techniques that could feasibly be examined. Therefore, although this
study focused on the impact of only two inﬂuence techniques (authority
and urgency), future work should explore the potential role of other
inﬂuence techniques and message-related factors, such as the time of
day that an email is received, in impacting susceptibility within the
workplace.
Future work exploring the extent to which employees divulge con-
ﬁdential information (e.g., usernames and passwords) after clicking on
a link would also be beneﬁcial to explore when people may become
suspicious of attempts to elicit information. However, whether people
click on malicious links alone, and how to reduce this, is still of interest
to organisational security personnel. Overall, the use of such data re-
presents a novel approach in exploring spear phishing susceptibility in
applied settings, and we believe that it provides a unique method for
exploring the impact of message-related factors on response behaviour,
which we hope will be built upon in future work.
4.4. Conclusions
In sum, the ﬁndings of our study highlight the importance of con-
sidering the wider work context in relation to employee susceptibility to
both spear phishing emails and phishing in general. Work-based norms
and routines likely represent a primary factor impacting response be-
haviour within the workplace, inﬂuencing the development of context-
speciﬁc habits, expectations and perceptions of risk. These are all likely
to inﬂuence the information processing strategies that are used when a
suspicious email is encountered and its resultant success. Reﬂective of
the combined ﬁndings of Study One and Two, considering aspects of the
email that is received, the individual who receives it, and the context in
which it is encountered, within theoretical approaches is vital if sus-
ceptibility within the workplace is to be truly understood. It is hoped
that the ﬁndings of the current study will provide a basis for further
theoretical development in this ﬁeld, whilst also presenting an initial
aid for user communities to consider, and begin to address, the range of
potential susceptibility factors that may be present within organisa-
tional settings.
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